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Divining Peace From Political Terrorism in Mozambique:
A Case for Negotiating With Terrorists
Kevin Ellsworth
Introduction

Literature Review

Counter-terrorist efforts frequently
entail the narrow policy options of
repression, violent confrontation, and
retaliation. The United States' "no deals"
policy (Busby 1990, 1), for example, has
long been widely accepted and praised.
Often, however, these tactics are ineffective
and even detrimental to peace-making
efforts.
Consequently, broader counterterrorism strategies must be considered
which include concession and negotiation.
Mozambique's recent peace process and
several new theoretical frameworks support
the thesis that negotiation and concession are
effective means of divining peace from
political terrorism.
After a review of the relevant
literature, I expose the limits of the
traditional anti-terrorist approach by
discussing first the weaknesses inherent in
defining terrorism--weaknesses which tend
to prevent an effective resolution by
imposing narrow policy choices which
exclude concession and
negotiation.
Second, I introduce Mozambique's terrorist
organization, Renamo, and demonstrate that
it fulfills all facets of terrorism's traditional
definitions. Third, I demonstrate that in
spite of Renamo's terrorist character,
negotiation and concession have established
a peace which repression and retaliation
never provided.
Finally, I review two
conflict resolution theories which when
applied to counter-terrorism encourage
concession over repression and help explain
Mozambique's successful peace process.

A vast amount of literature IS
available concerning terrorism and its
contributing factors, especially by Jeffrey
Ross (1993) who synthesizes most previous
work on causal approaches to terrorism.
Substantial writings are also available which
attempt to define terrorism and document its
occurrences. Research is lacking, however,
which addresses negotiating with terrorist
organizations. Almost universally, scholars
and politicians prescribe a hard-line
approach of preemption, repression, violent
confrontation, and sometimes retaliation
when confronting terrorist organizations.
Available research regarding negotiations
deals primarily with isolated terrorist
incidents such as hijackings, kidnappings,
and hostage situations (Atkinson, Sandler
and Tschirhart 1987; Ochberg 1985; Roukis
Such
1983; and Zartman 1990).
negotiations do not address the terrorist
organization as a whole or the possibility of
a lasting peace.
These studies are useful when applied
in some situations, but they do not deal with
resolving the deeper ills of terrorism. The
hard-line approach is effective when dealing
with smaller, manageable cases of terrorism,
but many nations are confronting terrorism
on a much grander scale, a scale which calls
for a different approach. The hard-line
approach is ineffective and detrimental in
third world nations where governments have
neither the military resources nor political
capital to address terrorism in the hard-line
fashion, such as in Peru, Sri Lanka, and
Mozambique, or in first world nations
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confronted by well armed and organized
terrorist organizations, as in the United
Kingdom, Italy, and Israel.
Literature regarding political violence
in general is abundant, but terrorism is
something of a unique breed which has not
been sufficiently addressed. Terrorism's
perceived immoral component has
encouraged anti-terrorist policy to bypass
relevant conflict resolution analysis, causing
governments to sometimes wage losing
battles rather than seek peace through
compromise and negotiation. Once the
scope of policy options is broadened beyond
the moral constraints of the anti-terrorist
tradition, several studies on general political
violence apply directly to situations like
Mozambique's (Gupta, Singh, and Sprague
1993; and Lichbach 1987).
Regarding Mozambique's peace
process, much has been written to document
the conflict (Finnegan 1992; Hanlon 1991;
Morgan 1990; and Hoile 1989). However,
only Alden and Simpson (1993) have tried
to analyze the peace process, but they focus
primarily on the factors which brought the
warring sides to the negotiating table and the
history of the negotiations. They fail to
generalize any theoretical implications of the
Mozambican case study, or discuss the
implications of successful negotiations with
terrorists.

definitions have emerged such as the
following:
•

Violent, criminal behavior designed
primarily to generate fear in the
community, or a substantial segment
of it, for political purposes (National
Advisory Committee on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals 1976,
3).

•

Symbolic action designed to
influence political behavior by
extranormal means entailing the use
or threat of violence (Thornton 1964,
71-99).

•

The culturally unacceptable use or
threat of violence directed toward
symbolic targets to influence political
behavior whether directly through
fear , intimidation or coercion, or
indirectly by affecting attitudes,
emotions, or opinions (Field and
Estes 1985).

Even with relatively specific definitions, the
problem of application is still evident.
Depending on one's moral or political
perspective, such diverse organizations as
the Irish Republican Army, the Nicaraguan
Contra's, or the United Nations in Iraq
could all fit these definitions.
To clarify this ambiguity, policy
makers often add a moral component to
their definition of a terrorist. This moral
distinction is, however, neither operative nor
practical.
Instead, it complicates the
resolution process by sanctioning policies
based more on subjective moral judgments
than on an objective reality. The results are
sometimes devastating and war rages where
peace might otherwise be created. To
demonstrate this point, I will use the last
above-mentioned definition of terrorism to
show that Mozambique's terrorist force is a

Denning Terrorism
The first step in seeking more
effective anti-terrorist policies, is inspecting
terrorism's inherently vague definition and
the resulting vague label of terrorist. Many
scholars have struggled to compose a
comprehensive and exclusive definition for
terrorism, but they continually confront
numerous gray areas between terrorism and
what may also be perceived as civil war,
international aggression, governmental
oppression, or armed revolution. Many
-57-
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model terrorist force in the traditional sense,
and consequently a standard against which to
measure the failure of traditional counterterrorism efforts and the success of a
negotiated peace.

Symbolic Targets
When Mozambique gained its
independence in 1974 and the new Frelimo
government came to power, the country
desperately needed educational and health
care facilities, so one of Frelimo's first
efforts was to construct hundreds of schools
and health centers. These institutions soon
came to represent the government in the
minds of many Mozambicans, and therefore
became excellent symbolic targets in the
minds of Renamo. Between 1980 and 1988
alone, Renamo "rendered incapable" 1,800
schools and 720 health care facilities (Vines
1991, 17).
Another significant target had been
Mozambique's economy. By targeting the
economy, Renamo not only weakened the
government, but it also symbolically
attacked the government's strength and
sovereignty. To disrupt an already weak
economy, Renamo incapacitated 900 stores
and 1,300 trucks and busses (Vines 1991,
17).
Many roads were completely
impassable and the railroads were under
constant threat. Because the threat was so
serious, neighboring Zimbabwe posted
10,000 troops along the Mozambican
railways it used in order to protect
Zimbabwe's economic interests.
By 1990 Renamo's attacks had cost
Mozambique $15 billion (Schneidman 1991,
1) , and forced the government to spend
approximately 40 percent of its budget on
defense (Morgan 1990, 617). In 1990
Mozambique was designated by the "World
Bank as the world's poorest country, with a
GNP per capita of just $100" (Meldrum
1992, 29). Sixty percent of its people live
in absolute poverty, meaning they lack
adequate nutrition "even though 60 percent
of their total income is spent on food"

Mozambique's Terrorist Organization
The Mozambican terrorist
organization, known as the Mozambican
National Resistance or Renamo, fits the last
above-mentioned definition of terrorism in
every aspect:
•
•
•
•
•

Renamo uses culturally unacceptable
force
Directed toward symbolic targets
In an attempt to influence political
behavior
By use of direct fear, intimidation,
and coercion
And indirect influence over attitudes,
emotions, and opinions.
Culturally Unacceptable Force

During 17 years of war against
Mozambique's government, Renamo has
killed hundreds of thousands of
Mozambicans to consolidate their power and
create an atmosphere of terror. In their
widely publicized Romoine Massacre,
Renamo murdered 424 people including
many who were bedridden in a hospital and
new born infants. "Almost half [of the
victims] were women," and many were
children (Van Koevering 1987, 43).
Smaller but similar attacks occurred
frequently. Overall, Renamo killed as many
as 100,000 people and indirectly caused the
deaths of another 600,000 to one million
(Perlez 1992, I[A]) and (Ayisi 1989, 60).
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(Chelala 1992, 19). Many felt that the
economic devastation was so massive that
"development [would] not begin until the
rebels [were] either destroyed or
incorporated into the country's government"
(Huffman 1992, 27).

Ifluence over Attitudes, Emotions, and
Opinions
At first, these atrocities led
Mozambique's general population to hate
Renamo which prevented Mozambique's
government from compromlSlng with
Renamo. As the war waged on, however,
this attitude began to soften. Renamoinduced starvation, for example, had a
substantial impact on the Mozambicans'
attitudes.
In 1992, four million Mozambicans
were under threat of starvation (Matonse
1992, 29) due mostly to "terrorist
activities," which had forced farmers from
their land and severed many transportation
routes (U.S. Congress, House 1988, 7). By
creating an atmosphere of hopelessness
through extreme poverty, starvation, and
fear, Renamo has imposed upon the
Mozambican people a weariness and
readiness for compromise.
A former
Frelimo supporter articulated the general
feeling of many desperate Mozambicans, "I
don't even care anymore what kind of
government we have, just so long as we
have peace" (Meldrum 1992,32). One man
released from a rebel-held area stated his
highest hopes saying, "Maybe we will be
able to move a little bit now and search for
food ... " (perlez 1992, 1[A]). By 1992
starvation and desperation had driven both
sides to negotiate a settlement.

Attempts to Influence Political Behavior
Since its birth, Renamo has been a
political actor. The white-minority ruled
Rhodesian government originally established
Renamo to destabilize and discredit
Mozambique's black-ruled,
Marxist
government. Since Rhodesia's demise and
South Africa's withdrawal from the
Mozambican conflict, Renamo has now
resorted to consolidating military and
political power for itself.
Use of Fear, Intimidation, and Coercion
The Mozambican people lived in
constant fear that they would fall victim to
Renamo's unpredictable attacks, a fear
Renamo intentionally cultivated. Renamo
sometimes cut off the ears, nose, and lips of
their victims and then allowed them to live
as a source of warning and fear to all who
saw them (perlez 1992, 13 October, 8[A]).
Renamo also coerced villages to provide
Renamo with food and manpower--men and
boys as young as thirteen years were forced
to join Renamo's ranks.
The coercion did not end once these
men were compelled into service. Under
threat of death, Renamo forced the
kidnapped recruits to fight with them
(Minter 1989, 18).
One reporter
interviewed 32 Renamo terrorists and
thirteen of which "had personal knowledge
of the execution of Renamo combatants who
tried to escape" (Minter 1989, 19). One
escaped Mozambican claimed "the first thing
they tell you is that if you try to escape,
we'll kill you" (Ottaway 1992, 25[AD.

The Peace Process
The negotiating process formally
began in July 1990 when Mozambique's nowin predicament had become evident and the
Frelimo government began bargaining
directly with Renamo. After many
concessions and compromise, on 4 October
1992 the Frelimo government and Renamo
signed a peace treaty officially ending the 17
year war. The peace negotiations made it
-59-
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clear that "while the Chissano
[Mozambique's current president]
government is opposed to many of
Renamo's demands, it is losing the will to
argue about principles while its
administration is rapidly collapsing"
(Meldrum 1992, 32).
Consequently, Mozambique's
government has been forced to make some
very substantial compromises.
It is
currently revising the national anthem
(Zandamela 1993), and it agreed to change
the country's name from the People's
Republic of Mozambique to the Republic of
Mozambique.
Other major concessions
include the following:

•

•
•

needs to create a stable political environment
which will secure a lasting peace.
There is still room for skepticism
concerning the durability of the peace,
especially given the slow pace of troop
demilitarization. But overall the process has
been surprisingly successful in preparing for
long term peace. This success demonstrates
itself in a number of ways.
War Fatigue
One of the most positive factors
contributing to the peace process is the
nation-wide weariness of war and desire for
peace. On the first year anniversary of the
peace accord Aldo Ajello, UN special
representative to Mozambique, announced
that "Mozambique had enjoyed a year
without fighting" and claimed that because
the Mozambican people had tasted peace "it
would be hard for either side to go back to
war" (BBC World Service 1993).
As a result of this war fatigue, both
sides of the conflict have supported the
peace process and solicited international
support for peace. Both President Joaquim
Chissano and Afonso Dhlakama, Renamo's
leader, have visited many foreign capitals in
order to solicit assistance. Consequently,
the peace process has received international
attention and substantial United Nations
assistance.

Complete political asylum for all
Renamo soldiers (a significant
compromise considering many
citizens view these men as ruthless
murderers) .
The establishment of a unified armed
forces made up equally by the
government and the rebels.
UN supervised elections with
Renamo as a legitimate contender for
the country's leadership.

The crucial question remains: Will
these compromises payoff? Will they
provide the peace that Mozambique desires
or will the country relapse into war? More
than one year into the peace process,
evidence is emerging for much optimism.

UN Peacekeeping Efforts
Because all sides of the conflict agree
on the need for international assistance, they
have opened the door for substantial UN
involvement. One opposition party leader
stated that "the United Nations has a great
deal of influence, and we can say that the
Mozambican people have been very lucky"
(Radio Mozambique Network 1993, 7 June,
1030).
Even Renamo's president has
"appealed for greater UN involvement in

Factors of Hope
So far the peace accord has been an
overwhelming success. Almost immediately
after the peace accord was signed the
fighting stopped (perlez, 16 October, 8[A]),
and there has been very little violence since.
For the peace process to be considered truly
successful, however, much more than
temporary peace is needed; Mozambique
-60-
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order to prevent a repetition of what has
happened in Angola" (Radio Mozambique
Network 1993, 4 October, 05(0).
The UN effort, entitled the United
Nations Operations in Mozambique
(UNOMOZ), began with a small token force
of only 25 peacekeepers (pedez 1992, 16
October, 8[A]) , but quickly increased to
6,200 by the end of May 1993. (Radio
Mozambique Network, 28 May, 1030). The
UN effort has solicited widespread
international support; currently twenty-four
nations are participating in UNOMOZ
(Radio Mozambique Network, 28 May,
1030).
The United Nation's involvement is
not however limited to peacekeeping
activities. The UN has also agreed to fund
Renamo with $10 million to assist its
transition to a political party (Radio
Mozambique Network 1993, 20 May,
1730), and UNICEF is providing an
education for many displaced children
(Radio Mozambique Network 1993, 8 June,
1100).

Several governmental policies are
facilitating troop demobilization. To enable
many of the troops to demobilize, they are
given three months wage to help them start
a new life (Baloi 1993, 23). Some troops,
however, are not being paid, and observers
fear that disgruntled troops might resort to
banditry. A few incidents support this
concern, but others contradict it. One
demobilized soldier claimed "the most
important thing is that I am going home. I
was tired of fighting. With or without
money, the fact is that I will be at home"
(Baloi 1993, 26). Furthermore, to ease the
transition the government is offering
abandoned farm land to demobilized soldiers
(Channel African Radio 1993).
Reintegrating twenty thousand
Renamo rebels into society could be
especially difficult for personal and social
reasons.
Many Renamo soldiers have
known no other life but war, so adjustment
will be difficult. Fortunately, Renamo's
character should make demobilization easier.
Renamo differs from other terrorist or rebel
forces in that many of the members support
Of 32 Renamo
Renamo unwillingly.
soldiers interviewed, only one claimed he
belonged to Renamo for ideological reasons
(Minter 1989, 18).
When given the
opportunity, many escape. In 1988 the
government offered amnesty to anyone who
left Renamo, and 3,000 accepted.
In addition to Renamo troops'
adjustment, Mozambican society may also
have difficulties with Renamo' s
demobilization.
Of 170 Mozambican
refugees interviewed, 91 % felt very
negatively toward Renamo (Huffman 1992,
116). Fortunately, war fatigue has made
this a somewhat moot point. The general
feeling among Mozambicans is that they can
accept Renamo troops and work with them
to start their lives together anew (Zandamela
1993).

Troop Demobilization
Piet Kruger, UNOMOZ coordinator
in charge of troop demobilization, estimated
there were originally 80 to 100 thousand
active Frelimo and Renamo soldiers (Radio
Mozambique Network 1993, 8 June, 1100).
Demobilizing these soldiers is a monumental
task which Aldo Ajello claims is one of
Mozambique's most crucial problems (Radio
Mozambique Network 1993, 15 October,
1030).
Unfortunately, by the first
anniversary of the peace accord, when
elections were originally planned to be held,
"neither side has demobilized a single
soldier or handed in a single weapon" (BBC
World Service 1993). By January 1994,
however, 8,340 Frelimo and 5,400 Renamo
troops had been demobilized (MEDIAF AX
1994, 2).
-61-
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Troop Integration

Network 1993, 29 October, 14(0).
Although Chissano and Dhlakama
still disagree on many issues, they have been
able to build a close personal relationship
which is very beneficial to the peace
process. Dhlakama said that "the two of us
have had conversations, and we often tell
jokes and laugh" (Radio Mozambique
Network 1993, 22 October, 1730). UN
Representative Ajello also voiced his
approval stating "he was pleased with the
atmosphere" the two leaders were creating
and the real understanding they were
forming between them (Radio Mozambique
Network 1993, 22 October, 1730).

Another potential source of conflict
is likewise rapidly diminishing--the creation
of the Armed Defense Forces of
Mozambique composed of 15,000 soldiers
from each party. On August 16, 1993 the
first 100 men (50 from each side) were sent
to a leadership training base in Nyanga,
Zimbabwe. Several weeks into the training,
the integration showed signs of success.
Soldiers who had been shooting at each
other just months earlier were "working,
eating, and living together" apparently with
no conflict (TEMPO 1993, 10-12). Most
observers could not perceive any differences
among the men at all.
A former government soldier, who at
first doubted the plan's potential for success,
claimed later to "feel very good about it."
A former Renamo soldier claimed the
experience was "very constructive." In
October, another 440 soldiers joined the first
100, and together these 540 soldiers were
prepared to train and lead the 30,000 man
unified army (TEMPO 1993, 10-12). By
February 21, 1994 the first six battalions of
700 men each were to report for this
training (Radio Mozambique Network 1994,
2 February, 1730).

Miscellaneous Factors
Several miscellaneous aspects of
Mozambique's current status cause one to
question whether overcoming such great
problems is possible. For example, the
economy is still a shambles, and millions of
Mozambicans are still displaced or living as
refugees abroad who must be reintegrated
into society and the economy. Malawi alone
harbors almost one million refugees
(Huffman 1992, 114).
Furthermore,
Mozambique's infrastructure is still mostly
unusable, due to an estimated two million
land mines (Radio Mozambique Network
1993, 18 May, 1030).
In contrast to these problems,
hundreds of refugees are coming home and
being successfully reintegrated.
Approximately 1.5 million who were
displaced abroad and domestically have
returned to their homes with very few
problems (Radio Mozambique Network
1993, 19 October, 1030), a sign "that the
people believe that peace has come to
stay ... " (Engineering News 1993, 36).
Furthermore, the destruction of the
economy has stopped, and more
importantly, Mozambique is creating the
political stability that will help the economy

Building Trust
Before demobilization can begin in
full force, a certain amount of mutual trust
is necessary. "Reflecting on a year of peace
in Mozambique, Aldo Ajello admitted there
was one obvious cause for regret--a total
failure to build trust between the two sides"
(BBC World Service 1993).
Soon
thereafter, however, the two parties made
agreements" which caused Ajello to claim
that the "peace machine is working at full
speed," and that "the government and
Renamo are slowly overcoming their
mistrust of each other" (Radio Mozambique
-62-
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grow. Prospects of economic development
are even brighter considering that all sides
of the conflict are working together to
encourage economic development.
Dhlakama now pleads for the reconstruction
of "shops, schools, hospitals, roads, and
bridges" which he has spent the last two
decades destroying (Radio Mozambique
Network 1993, 21 May 1030). South
Africa's Engineering News claims that "as
peace takes hold in Mozambique after
almost 30 years of war, so optimism is
taking hold. Foreign investors and tourists
are flooding back to the country to rebuild
its infrastructure. . . " (36). Already 200
foreign investors have begun projects with
Mozambique, and several major
corporations including Coca Cola and
Colgate-Palmolive are strongly considering
seIzmg business opportunities there
(Southern African Economist 1993, 22 and
23).

understanding and reacting to terrorism are
insufficient and counterproductive in some
situations.
Abandoning previous
assumptions does not, however, leave policy
makers without a foundation for analysis and
action. Instead, a multitude of theoretical
conflict resolution models may be refined
and applied to address political terrorism.
Two conflict resolution theories, in
particular, demonstrate concepts of general
political violence that are easily applied to
terrorist violence: the research of Mark
Lichbach (1987) and Dipak Gupta, Harinder
Singh, and Tom Sprague (1993). The two
theories explore the relationship between
governmental coercion and the magnitude
and quality of political dissent--a relationship
crucial to political terrorism.
Jeffery Ross alludes to the
importance of this relationship in his causal
study of oppositional terrorism. Among
terrorism's precipitant causes (as opposed to
structural causes), he ranks grievances as the
most influential (320). Among potential
grievances, he discusses legal grievances
which closely parallel Lichbach's and
Gupta's concept of governmental coercion or
repression (Ross 1993, 325). Lichbach and
Gupta et al.have expounded greatly on this
relationship.
Mark Lichbach (1987) reviews
several debated relationships between
governmental repression (indicated as
increasing with the X-axis) and political
violence (indicated as increasing with the Yaxis), and considers four different models
signified in Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Traditional anti-terrorism approaches would
endorse the model shown in Figure 2, which
prescribes more coercion to stop political
violence, but Lichbach suggests another
theory. He believes that "an increase in a
government's repression of nonviolence will
reduce the nonviolent activities of an
opposition group but increase its violent

Evaluating the Peace Accord's Success
Although the debate over the peace
accord's success cannot yet be completely
settled, most indicators point toward a
successful conclusion to the peace process.
Even if the worst case materializes and the
country plunges back into war,
Mozambicans will have experienced more
than a year of peace they would not have
enjoyed otherwise. At the very best, 15
million Mozambicans can live out their lives
in peace.
Theoretical Application of
Mozambique's Case Study: Negotiating
with Terrorists
One lesson that may be extracted
from the Mozambican experience, is that
policy makers should sometimes cast off the
dogmatic hard-line approach. They should
accept that traditional methods of
-63-
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activities" (Lichbach 1987, 266). According
to his model, the traditional reaction to
terrorism--repression and non-negotiation-would increase, not lessen terrorist violence.
Grupta etal.
(1993) analyze this same
relationship between coercion and political
dissent by graphing the relationship of
empirical data they collected. They also
break down the analysis between democratic
and non-democratic nations, and between
violent and less violent political dissent.
They summarize their fmdings in the table
found in Appendix 1 (335).
Considering that political terrorist
violence contains many of the qualities
measured in the Political Instability
Quotient, deaths from domestic group
violence, and armed attacks, Gupta, Singh
and Sprague's conclusions may also be
applied to the effect of governmental
repression on terrorist violence.
Their findings generally depict two
relationships:
a positive relationship
(similar to Figure 1) for democracies, and
an inverted U relationship (similar to Figure
4) for nondemocracies.
This second
relationship seems to indicate that increasing
governmental repression in a nondemocratic
country may sometimes lessen terrorist
violence. Gupta et al. admit, however, that
few countries sufficiently coerce their
citizens to place the relationship on the
negatively sloped side of the graph. Most
regimes find themselves on the positively
sloped side of the graph where increasing
coercion increases political instability (323).
Therefore, except for a few extremely
coercive nondemocratic governments, all of
Gupta's findings agree with Lichbach's
claim that increased governmental coercion
only increases political violence (the positive
relationship found in Figure 1).
Each of these theories accurately
explains the success of Mozambique's peace
As the government began to
process.
negotiate with Renamo, the government's

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3

Figure 4
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coercive effect was drastically reduced.
Consequently, and as both models had
predicted, political violence declined.

which may confirm or rebut the wisdom of
negotiating with terrorists. The first is the
newly publicized negotiations between the
United Kingdom's government and Sinn
Fein, the political arm of the IRA. The
second is the ongoing negotiations between
Israel and the PLO. In each of these cases,
however, significant extra-governmental
coercion plays a role which should also be
considered as part of the coercion-violence
relationship.
Further study will also be needed
regarding the Mozambican peace process as
it continues to develop. Events in the
coming year, the elections next October, and
the adjustment period thereafter will paint a
more complete picture of the effects reduced
governmental coercion have on political
violence. For the present time, however,
the peace process appears to be successful,
and negotiating with terrorists is in this
instance a successful counter-terrorist
approach.

Conclusion
In Mozambique an unconventional
approach to terrorism has been successful,
but this should not be surprising.
By
examining ambiguous definitions of
terrorism and viewing two conflict
resolution theories in the terrorist context,
one finds that untraditional approaches may
prove very successful in other situations
similar to Mozambique's.
Further study is still needed before
this conclusion can be more generally
applied. Mozambique's unique political
situation, the magnitude of the conflict, the
willingness of Renamo to negotiate, and the
willingness of the international community
to assist the negotiation all play a vital role
in the peace. Two historic opportunities lie
before the scholarly community at this time
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APPENDIX 1

Summary Results of Relations Between Repression and Dissident Activities

Regime Type l

Overall PI~

Deaths from
Domestic Group
Violence

Armed Attacks

Protest
Demonstrations

Democracies

Insignificant

Positive

Positive

Positive

Democracies
(Gurr)

Insignificant

Positive

Positive

Positive

Nondemocracies

Inverted U

Inverted U

Inverted U

Insignificant

Nondemocracies
(Gurr)

Inverted U

Inverted U

Indeterminate

Indeterminate

2

Note that two definitions of democracies and nondemocracies were used (the second offered by Ted
Gurr) which offered only slightly differing results concerning armed attacks and protest demonstrations
in nondemocracies.
"Political Instability Quotient" takes into account the number of political demonstrations, riots, political
strikes, deaths from political violence, assassinations, armed attacks, political executions, and attempted
coups d'etat.
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